Optis v. Apple-New Changes in UK Courts Handling Standard Necessary Patent Disputes
In recent years, with the rapid development of communication technology and the 3C market, cross-border lawsuits related to Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the communication field have frequently occurred between major technology companies and Non Practicing Entities (NPEs). Taking into account multiple dimensions such as market size, market share, convenience of judicial procedures, and court decision-making tendencies, a set of effective practices has gradually been formed among the main participants in the above-mentioned litigation, including which country's jurisdiction to choose as the litigation battlefield, and how to construct litigation strategies and scenarios between different country's jurisdictions. Specifically, Germany is often the primary battlefield for SEP rights holders due to its relatively fast infringement litigation proceedings and easily accessible and enforceable injunction remedies. The UK, on the other hand, has become a new favorite of SEP rights holders in recent years with the arbitration rules established in the 2017 Unwired Planet and Huawei SEP dispute case [1] (hereinafter referred to as the "UP case"), such as the ability to determine global licensing rates and the ability to impose matching FRAND injunctions on SEP implementers. Compared to German courts that focus on the issuance of injunctions, British courts can not only provide injunction relief, but also make rulings on the substantive issues of SEP disputes, such as license fees and conditions, and provide them as alternative solutions to injunctions to SEP implementers. This complete set of solutions can better meet the commercial expectations of rights holders. But the above operations can also bring a series of side effects, such as jurisdictional disputes based on global licensing rates, lengthy case review cycles, and expensive litigation costs. In 2020, NPE company Optis chose the UK as one of the litigation venues to initiate SEP related lawsuits against Apple. This lawsuit came to an end in October 2022. In the two-year litigation process, in addition to answering some unique questions in this case, the British court has once again adjusted the judgment rules established in the UP case, advancing the grant time of the FRAND injunction, further accelerating the trial cycle, objectively reducing the threshold for SEP rights holders to sue, making the British court increasingly one of the best choices for SEP rights holders.
01 Optis v. AppleBackground of the case
As a globally leading and financially strong technology company, as well as an implementer of SEP, Apple often becomes a challenge for many SEP rights holders. In 2019, Optis filed an SEP infringement lawsuit against Apple in a Texas court, alleging that Apple's iPhone series products with 3G and 4G capabilities infringed upon its ownership of the relevant SEP. The Texas court ruled that Apple would compensate Optis a total of $506 million, but the ruling was later overturned by the United States District Court in April 2021 and retried by the Eastern District Court of Texas. Optis ultimately won the lawsuit again and received $300 million in compensation. Meanwhile, Optis has filed a lawsuit against Apple in the UK over all eight SEPs. According to the consistent trial approach of the British court, this case is divided into six Trials (Trial A-F) based on specific trial objects: A, B, C, D, E, and F. Trials A to D involve the trial of patent technology issues, including the validity of SEP owned by Optis, whether it is benchmarking (Essentiality), and whether Apple's accused product is infringing (Infringement). Trial E is used to determine the FRAND license terms between Optis and Apple [3], while Trial F is used to address FRAND injunction issues, commonly known as FRAND trials.
Due to the consistency of the scope protected by the SEP claims with the communication standards implemented by major companies in the industry, objectively speaking, as long as the stability of the SEP involved is challenged, the probability of the SEP implementer ultimately being judged as patent infringement by the court is extremely high. Therefore, in such cases, the international community usually pays more attention to how the implementer challenges the effectiveness and benchmarking of SEP, and how the court provides necessary remedies for the SEP rights holder after being judged as patent infringement. In this case, how Apple challenges the stability of Optis SEP and how the court judges whether to issue a FRAND injunction to Apple in accordance with Optis' requirements through Trial F has become a major focus of industry attention. In addition, the issuance and timing of the injunction often have a decisive impact on the progress of the case, especially for this case. According to Statista's statistics (refer to Figure 2) [4], since 2011, the iPhone alone has occupied more than 40% of the UK mobile phone market for a long time. Considering the high value of the UK market, from a rational perspective, the probability of Apple withdrawing from the UK market due to the injunction is 0. Therefore, the issuance of the injunction will have to lead to a compromise and settlement between Apple and Optis, and accelerating the litigation process and promoting the court's issuance of injunctions has become Optis' main litigation goal.

02 Optis v. Apple Focus of dispute in the case
Due to the fact that this case is divided into 6 trials, each with its own dedicated trial object, the focus of controversy in each trial is not the same. Now, a brief introduction and analysis will be made on the controversial points that have caused much discussion in the industry in Trial A-F.
1. Can the delayed declaration by the SEP rights holder to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) constitute a property estoppel defense for the SEP implementer in SEP infringement litigation
This Trial B involves a technical trial of European patent EP2229744B1. During the process of advancing this Trial, Apple raised a defense based on the principle of estoppel. Specifically, Apple believes that the former patentee of the patent, Ericsson, violated the provisions of Article 4.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Policy regarding the technology claims related to the patent, which limits the remedies that Optis may receive in relation to the patent. According to Article 4.1 of this intellectual property policy, ETSI members shall promptly notify ETSI of their intellectual property rights when participating in the development of standards or technical specifications, especially when the technical information submitted by the member will be adopted as part of the standard, and intellectual property related to the technical information needs to be notified. The provision in Article 4.1 is beneficial for standard setting participants to have a clear understanding of whether the technical standards they support have been patented, and if so, whether there are non patented technical solutions available for selection. Ericsson submitted a temporary patent application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in January 2008. In the same year, while participating in the 3GPP RAN WG2 conference, Ericsson successfully included the technology involved in the temporary patent application in the ETSI TS 36.322 standard, making it part of the LTE standard. However, it was not until 2010 that Ericsson declared the existence of the temporary patent application to ETSI. Therefore, objectively speaking, Ericsson's declaration of this patent violated the provisions of Article 4.1 of the ETSI intellectual property policy. In response to this controversy, Optis argues that it is actually irrelevant whether Ericsson has made a declaration about the technology, as this does not affect the fact that the technology will actually become part of the standard, and in practice, most ETSI members do not make a declaration about strictly adhering to the provisions of Article 4.1, including Apple itself. Judge Meade, who is responsible for the trial of this case, cited case law and concluded that at least three elements need to be considered in determining the validity of Apple's rebuttal, namely (1) Assurance; (2) Reliance; (3) Detriment in consequence of the dependence. It is necessary for the parties to guarantee a certain fact, which makes the third party dependent on the guarantee. Once the guarantee is violated, the third party will be harmed due to the dependency relationship. In terms of element one "guarantee", Apple believes that Ericsson has ensured to ETSI through silent recognition that there are no patented technologies in its submitted documents. However, based on the evidence provided by Optis and the analysis of Judge Meade, it can be seen that delaying the patent declaration to ETSI is already common for all members of ETSI and ETSI itself, and ETSI staff will not believe that there are no patented technologies in the standards submitted by Ericsson. As for the remaining two elements, Judge Meade believes that there is no equivalent alternative solution to the technology involved in this patent, and whether the technology has been patented is not actually a matter that ETSI considers when evaluating whether such technology is included in the standard. Furthermore, Judge Meade analyzed the historical evolution of ETSI's intellectual property policy and the French law that has jurisdiction over the policy. He believed that ETSI would only consider "delayed declaration" as a problem when dealing with SEP implementers who are unable to obtain licenses or when it is necessary to determine whether the license terms comply with the FRAND principle. At the same time, according to relevant provisions of the French Civil Code, the interpretation of Article 4.1 of ETSI's intellectual property policy should be based on the common intention of the parties involved, rather than just staying at the literal meaning of the article. Based on the above reasons, Apple's rebuttal defense was ultimately not supported by Judge Meade.
2. Is Apple an unfriendly licensee
Whether the licensee, i.e. the SEP implementer, holds a good faith attitude towards the license will directly affect the issuance of injunction relief by the court. After Apple was initially found to have infringed upon the patent rights of Optis, it made an extremely complex conditional commitment to Judge Meade, who was responsible for hearing Trial F, as well as to Optis. Judge Meade summarized the conditional commitment as agreeing to enter into a licensing agreement with Optis in accordance with the licensing conditions ultimately determined by Court Trial E, unless Apple deemed it unnecessary or too late. This conditional commitment provided Optis with the opportunity to quickly advance the FRAND injunction proceedings in this case. The FRAND injunction was established by Judge Birss in the UP case. Similar to the common injunctions in patent infringement cases, the ultimate implementation of the FRAND injunction is to prohibit the infringer from implementing the infringed patent in a specific market, that is, the infringer can no longer engage in the production, manufacturing, and sales of infringing products in that market. But unlike general injunctions, FRAND injunctions are conditional injunctions, meaning that if the SEP implementer granted a FRAND injunction is willing to accept the licensing conditions determined by the court to complete the licensing agreement, the injunction does not need to be enforced again. In this case, Optis argues that although Apple has made a commitment to accept the license according to the license conditions determined by the court, the commitment is accompanied by complex implementation conditions, which may result in Apple ultimately not accepting the license conditions determined by the court. Apple's behavior violates the obligation imposed by Article 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Policy on SEP implementers [6], so Apple is not a good faith licensee. Based on this, Optis further argues that the licensing conditions to be determined by the court in Trial E are no longer relevant, and Apple can no longer use the promise to accept the license as a defense against the FRAND injunction. Once it is confirmed that Apple has indeed violated Optis SEP, the court should issue an injunction to Apple as soon as possible without waiting for the trial to be concluded. Apple believes that it is unfair to unconditionally promise to accept the FRAND license conditions before it is completely unaware of what Trial E may determine. At the same time, Apple also argues that the license conditions proposed by Optis in negotiations seriously deviate from the FRAND principle, and its related actions have violated competition law and are suspected of abusing its dominant market position.
To resolve the above dispute, Judge Meade needs to analyze and answer the following four questions:
1. How to understand the rights and obligations established in Article 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Policy.
2. Is it necessary to make a judgment on Optis's violation of competition law and abuse of market dominance at this stage.
3. Does the FRAND injunction need to wait until all legal proceedings are concluded before it can be decided whether to issue it.
4. Should Apple make a commitment and what kind of commitment it should make.
Regarding question one, Optis advocates that Article 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Policy grants SEP rights holders and implementers the obligation to mutually undertake to obtain SEP licenses based on the FRAND principle. Specifically, Optis needs to promise to license to Apple in accordance with the FRAND principle. In response, Apple should actively participate in negotiations. If the two parties do not reach a license agreement during separate negotiations, they should reach a license agreement in accordance with the license conditions confirmed by the court. Apple should make an unconditional commitment to the court regarding the above content after the court determines that the Optis patent is valid and Apple has committed infringement. If these requirements cannot be met, Apple cannot be considered a good faith licensee, and it cannot obtain the license commitment made by Optis on an equal basis. Apple believes that Article 6.1 does not contain any other restrictions on the implementer, except for requiring the SEP implementer to seek permission, such as requiring the implementer to make a commitment to accept permission. As long as the implementer actively seeks permission, it can meet its obligations under Article 6.1. Therefore, the implementer has the right to decide whether to accept the permission and how to grant it after the court has determined the FRAND license conditions. Both Optis and Apple have hired economic experts to provide relevant economic analysis reports to support their views on the dispute. Similar to the analysis of Article 4.1 of the ETSI intellectual property policy in Trial B, Judge Meade cited relevant principle provisions of French law to explain the actual meaning of Article 6.1. At the same time, he further analyzed the rights and obligations between the SEP rights holders and implementers determined in the Huawei ZTE SEP dispute case [7] and the UP case, as well as the correct and incorrect aspects in the economic analysis report of Optis and Apple. Ultimately, it was determined that Article 6.1 does not grant the SEP implementer the right to be exempt from prosecution from the FRAND commitment of the rights holder without assuming corresponding obligations, nor does it provide the SEP implementer with the right to implement the patent without obtaining permission without being subject to injunctions. Apple shall make a commitment to accept the license conditions determined in Trial E, even if such conditions have not yet been finalized. Apple's current attitude is only a limited sense of "willingness" to accept licenses, that is, it only wants to obtain licenses according to its own conditions and at the time it chooses, while retaining the right to completely refuse licenses. This behavior will ultimately result in Apple being able to implement all of Optis's SEPs for at least one more year and refusing to accept possible FRAND license conditions, and this possibility will definitely not be the expected purpose when ETSI's intellectual property policy was formulated under Article 6.1. Furthermore, Optis advocates that SEP implementers should make the aforementioned commitments at the beginning of negotiations or at least after being identified as infringing. If they refuse to do so, implementers will permanently lose their right to obtain FRAND permission and obtain a permanent injunction. Regarding Optis's claim, Judge Meade accepted that the SEP implementer should make an unconditional commitment to accept permission after being found guilty of infringement, but this time should not be further advanced because the implementer cannot clearly understand whether they have actually used the relevant SEP before confirming the existence of infringement, and Judge Meade also rejected Optis's claim of permanent injunction.
For question two, Apple listed a total of 10 violations of competition law by Optis, suspected of abusing its dominant market position, mainly including Optis advocating for excessively high licensing fees, seeking unfair licensing terms, and bundling Non SEP and SEP licenses. Optis believes that based on the views of Judge Birss in the UP case, as long as Optis promises to comply with the FRAND licensing conditions determined by the court and Apple does not make a commitment, Optis cannot be deemed to have abused its market dominance. Judge Meade rejected Optis's claim, stating that in the UP case, Judge Briss not only referred to whether both parties had made a commitment to comply with the FRAND licensing conditions determined by the court, but also took into account many other factors. In fact, even if a commitment was made, there may still be abusive behavior, such as the SEP rights holder pressuring the implementer through litigation without notifying or fully negotiating with the implementer. In this case, the actual issue that needs to be addressed is whether Optis proposed overly strict licensing conditions or excessively high licensing fees during the negotiation process. However, these need to wait for Trial E to confirm the FRAND licensing conditions before making further judgments on whether Optis has violated competition laws. Therefore, Judge Meade will not determine whether Optis has abused its market dominance in Trial F. However, in order to facilitate the analysis of subsequent issues, Judge Meade believes that it is necessary to temporarily assume that Optis has abused its market dominance in certain issues of Trial F, but this is not the final result.
Regarding question three, Optis's view, as mentioned earlier, is that the court should promptly and early issue an injunction to Apple. However, Apple believes that according to the ruling rules of the UP case, due to Optis's abuse of market dominance, it should not be remedied through an injunction. To put it another way, even if an injunction should be issued, an injunction is still a discretionary measure. The court can only make a decision after Trial E has determined the FRAND license conditions and whether Optis has abused market dominance. At this stage, the court can replace the injunction with a ruling on damages compensation. Furthermore, if the court does issue an injunction to Apple in accordance with Optis's request, it will encourage Optis to abuse its market dominance and unreasonably exert negotiation pressure on Apple. Judge Meade first analyzed the relationship between the issuance of injunctions and the abuse of market dominance. He believed that the discussion of this issue in the UP case was only incidental, as the Unwired Planet, as the SEP rights holder in the UP case, was not ultimately deemed to have abused market dominance. However, Judge Briss did generally elaborate on the contradiction between the abuse of market dominance and the issuance of injunctions in the UP case. However, he also emphasized that the abuse of market dominance needs to be equivalent to the waiver of injunction relief, which can be analyzed from the perspectives of infringement duration, the implementer's attitude towards obtaining FRAND permission, and the feasibility of replacing injunctions with damages. Judge Briss also emphasized that in patent infringement,... It is normal to issue an injunction against the infringer in a case, Especially when the infringer can obtain permission but is unwilling to do so, taking into account all the considerations in the UP case, including the above conditions, Judge Meade believes that the actual reasoning in the UP case should be that refusing to issue an injunction often prevents SEP rights holders from obtaining sufficient relief, and also does not comply with the original intention of the FRAND principle established by ETSI. In addition, Judge Meade believes that further analysis is needed in this case to determine the potential impact of Optis's abusive behavior. Ultimately, Judge Meade pointed out that due to court intervention, even if Optis has engaged in abusive behavior and these behaviors have had negative effects, these effects have stopped or been prevented at this stage. Therefore, whether Optis has engaged in abusive market dominance in this case will not hinder the issuance of the injunction. Afterwards, Judge Meade once again refuted Apple's argument about discretionary measures and pointed out that in cases where SEP rights holders can comply with their FRAND commitments and there is no need for the court to refuse to issue injunctions to address the abuse of market dominance, the court usually grants injunctions and there is almost no space to further consider the issue of discretion.
Based on the above analysis, Judge Meade pointed out that if Apple wants to avoid the enforcement of the injunction, it should make a commitment to accept the FRAND license conditions determined by Trial E.
In summary, Judge Meade did not fully accept the claims of both parties in Trial F. He believed that it was currently impossible to determine whether Apple's accusation of Optis abusing its market dominance was true in Trial F. This issue needs to be resolved in Trial E. However, this accusation cannot prevent Apple from being granted an injunction based on the infringement identified in the technical trial. However, the injunction is not immediate and unconditional, and can be prevented from being enforced by making a commitment to the court willing to accept the licensing conditions determined by the court in Trial E.
Apple appealed the first instance verdict, and Optis also appealed accordingly. Apple's appeal mainly focuses on two aspects. Firstly, the first instance court wrongly interpreted the meaning of Article 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Policy. Secondly, the first instance court's issuance of a FRAND injunction against Apple is procedural illegality and will further help Optis abuse its market dominance. The appeal reasons for Optis still focus on whether Apple should be issued an unconditional ban. Judge Arnold of the appellate court gave a brief response to each party's reasons for appeal. It is obvious that Judge Arnold emphasized the need to avoid both patent hold up and patent hold out issues when interpreting the content of ETSI's intellectual property policy. If Apple decides whether to accept the FRAND license condition or be granted an injunction after the court confirms the FRAND license condition in Trial E, it will promote the problem of patent hold out for SEP implementers. As for whether Optis violates competition law, Judge Arnold of the appellate court agrees with Judge Meade's view that refusing to grant an Apple injunction in cases where SEP is deemed valid, benchmarking, and infringing would prevent Optis from obtaining sufficient relief measures. Therefore, Apple can only block the grant and enforcement of the injunction when providing very strong and compelling reasons. Currently, the argument that Optis abuses its dominant market position and violates competition law is not enough to prevent it from being granted an injunction. Even if Optis does indeed engage in abusive behavior, it can compensate Apple for the losses suffered due to such behavior through property compensation. Regarding Optis's appeal, Judge Arnold firmly rejected his unconditional injunction request against Apple, as this form of injunction would encourage patent hijacking and contradict the goals of ETSI's intellectual property policy. Judge Arnold still insisted on Meade's injunction against Apple, which should be based on Apple's promise in exchange for an opportunity for the injunction not to be enforced. Overall, Judge Arnold upheld the first instance court's ruling.
It is worth noting that Judge Arnold emphasized in the postscript of the judgment that the current system used to resolve the SEP/FRAND dispute is in a dysfunctional state. Both Optis and Apple insist on their own positions, attempting to operate the system in a way that benefits them. The only way to prevent this phenomenon is to have standard setting organizations like ETSI introduce mandatory arbitration procedures into intellectual property policies.
03 Optis v. Apple Case impact
As mentioned earlier, injunctions are the biggest nightmare for SEP implementers in SEP litigation, because once an injunction is enforced, it means that the implementer's products will no longer be able to be sold in a certain market, and the market share obtained from their long-term operation will also be burned, which will have a huge impact on commercial interests. Therefore, injunctions have become the biggest "weapon" of the court and the inevitable goal pursued by SEP rights holders. In practice, issuing injunctions can often quickly push the licensing parties into the settlement stage, causing the implementer to "yield". Although the UK courts have become one of the preferred places for SEP rights holders to engage in SEP litigation in recent years, compared to Germany's very fast temporary injunction, the issuance cycle of the UK FRAND injunction is very long, requiring multiple rounds of trial procedures. This long litigation cycle and the huge legal fees generated based on this long cycle have set a high threshold for SEP rights holders to protect their rights in the UK, especially for technology companies with large financial resources. Compared to higher licensing fees, these companies use fewer agency fees to recruit more professional legal teams, delay litigation proceedings through various legal channels, and make many small rights holders face litigation in the UK. The environment is daunting. However, in this case, the British court established a more radical ruling than the UP case, which states that once the owner's SEP is deemed valid, benchmarking, and infringed, they have the right to obtain a FRAND injunction, unless the SEP implementer promises to accept the FRAND license conditions established by the subsequent court. This means that the issuance of the FRAND injunction can be granted to the owner of the SEP case after partial technical trials have been completed and before the FRAND trial begins, without the need to wait for most of the trial procedures to end. This will greatly shorten the effective trial period of the SEP case in the British court, allowing the owner to quickly obtain the injunction and accelerate the negotiation progress with the SEP implementer. Reduce the cost of rights protection for rights holders, so in the foreseeable future, More SEP rights holders will challenge implementers in the UK.
annotation:
[1]Unwired Planet International Ltd, Unwired Planet LLC v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd, Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Ltd, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat)
[2]Optis Cellular Technology LLC, Optis Wireless Technology LLC and Unwired Planet International LTD v Apple Retail UK LTD, Apple Distribution International LTD and Apple Inc, Trial A: [2020] EWHC 2746 (Pat); Trial B: [2021] EWHC 1739 (Pat); Trail C: [2021] EWHC 3121 (Pat); Trail D: [2022] EWHC 561 (Pat); Trial E: [2021] EWHC 2080 (Pat); Trial F: [2021] EWHC 2564 (Pat).
[3]FRAND: Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory
[4]Market share of Apple iOS in the United Kingdom (UK) from December 2011 to August 2022,https://www.statista.com/statistics/271195/apple-ios-market-share-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/
[5]ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy “4.1 Subject to Clause 4.2 below, each MEMBER shall use its reasonable endeavours, in particular during the development of a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION where it participates, to inform ETSI of ESSENTIAL IPRs in a timely fashion. In particular, a MEMBER submitting a technical proposal for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION shall, on a bona fide basis, draw the attention of ETSI to any of that MEMBER's IPR which might be ESSENTIAL if that proposal is adopted.”
[6]ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy“6.1 When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms and conditions under such IPR to at least the following extent:
- MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customized components and sub-systems to the licensee's own design for use in MANUFACTURE;
- sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURED;
- repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and
- use METHODS.
The above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those who seek licences agree to reciprocate.”
[7]Huawei Technology Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH [2015] Case C-170/13 CJEU
The Lingshi team has always been committed to providing professional intellectual property legal services to technology-oriented enterprises worldwide. We help clients protect their innovations, realize the commercial value of their intellectual property, and enhance their competitive advantage. Lingshi lawyers are dedicated to establishing long-term, stable cooperative relationships with clients, fostering mutual growth, and sharing success.
Contact Phone:
Address: Room 308, Area B, Block F, Vanke Times Center, No. 9 Wangjing Street, Chaoyang District, Beijing
Zip Code: 100102
Telephone: 8615801368068
E-mail:legal@lingshilaw.com