Research on the system of tort profit compensation in the litigation of non patent implementation subject
Introduction
Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) are a special type of rights holders in the market, generally referring to entities that do not personally engage in patent production or manufacturing. In recent years, with the continuous improvement of China's intellectual property protection system, the activities of NPEs within China have gradually increased, and patent infringement lawsuits initiated by NPEs have also become more common. Currently, research on NPEs mainly focuses on temporary injunctions and malicious litigation, while the issue of damages compensation in NPE litigation is rarely mentioned.
From the current situation of judicial practice. At present, there is no court to discuss the NPE in the calculation of damages. Typical NPE patent lawsuits such as the Dunjun series [1], Dunjun's claim for damages based on the infringer's profit was supported by the Supreme Court. Another example is the case of the roller coaster series [2], although the defendant raised a defense against the claim that the plaintiff was the subject of NPE, the court did not respond and eventually applied the statutory compensation. The author believes that the reason for the above phenomenon is not only the difficulty of calculating the amount of damages in intellectual property disputes, but also the main reason is that NPE does not realize the particularity of NPE as the right holder in tort damages.
From the existing laws and regulations. After the revision of the Patent Law in 2020, the infringer's profit compensation has been raised to the first place in the calculation method of patent infringement damage compensation [3]. In response, the Law Working Committee of the National People's Congress pointed out: "In the process of this revision, the court system reflects that in practice, the loss of the obligee and the profit of the infringer are not easy to calculate, and the court is required to demonstrate whether the loss of the infringer's profit can be determined, unnecessarily increased the burden on the courts, and it was suggested that the provision on the order of application should be eliminated. The new patent law responds to the voice of the judiciary and cancels the order of application of the two" [4]. From this point of view, the reason for legislators to raise tort profit compensation to the first rank seems to be more to reduce the burden of litigation considerations. However, in the sense of the result, this legislative change may have an impact on the traditional theory of tort compensation, when the tort profit and the loss of the right holder become a parallel compensation scheme, in the application is bound to improve the independence of the right to claim compensation for tort profit to a certain extent.
Considering that the object of litigation initiated by NPE is usually large enterprises, and the main market is mostly concentrated in China, in this case, the calculation method of infringement profit compensation is often the best choice for NPE. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, more NPEs may choose to file patent lawsuits in China and choose infringement profits as the calculation method of damages. In the absence of judicial practice guidance, it is necessary to discuss the application of infringement profit compensation rules in NPE patent litigation cases.
In this paper, the author will start from the legal basis of infringement profit damages, through the analysis of domestic scholars' views, learn from the relevant experience of foreign countries, NPE such special rights holders in patent infringement cases in the infringement profit calculation method applicable to the problem.
The Legal Basis of 1. Infringement Profit Damages
The form of liability for returning the benefits of infringement to the right holder is commonly referred to as "profit deprivation" or "profit return". There is still controversy in the academic circles as to what kind of claim such beneficial compensation should be based on, but in general it can be divided into the following four types of views:
Viewpoint 1: The right to claim damages. The traditional view is that damages are designed to compensate for the damage suffered by the victim and should follow the "difference theory" and the "principle of full compensation" to restore the infringed to the state in which the damage did not occur. Under the guidance of this concept, the return of tort profit is only a method of determining the amount of tort damages, the benefit compensation should be based on the actual loss of the right holder, and the application of tort profit compensation should also be based on the existence of the actual loss. [5] However, many scholars have also questioned this idea, mainly arguing that liability for tort benefits should not simply be attributed to the theory of tort damages. Specifically, at present, there are three kinds of understanding of the liability of tort benefit, such as unjust enrichment, illegal management and other types of claim.
Viewpoint 2: Unjust enrichment claims. Functionally speaking, there is a consistency between tort benefit compensation and unjust enrichment, and the relief of profit return essentially has the rule characteristics of both unjust enrichment and tort damages, which is equivalent to expanding the scope of benefit return through the illegality theory of tort damages on the basis of unjust enrichment. [6] However, some scholars have argued that it is difficult for the unjust enrichment theory to fully cover compensation for tort gains, such as the distinction between "gain" and "gain" [7], and that unjust enrichment does not require "illegality", while tort gains are directed at illegal acts [8].
Point 3: Unlawful management claims. Some scholars believe that the return of profits can be claimed through the path of illegal management. [9] As long as the perpetrator lacks proper authority to intervene in the scope of the rights and interests of others for his own benefit, it constitutes the management of the affairs of others and the application of illegal management, under which it is not asked whether the right holder has the will to commercialize his or her rights and interests. At the same time, this path of interpretation is also in line with the theory of the German Patent Law, and German scholars generally believe that the reasonableness of compensation for infringement benefits is similar to that of the administrator of illegal management without cause to claim the return of the necessary costs arising from the management. [10]
Point 4: Other types of claims. Some scholars believe that tort benefit compensation cannot be attributed to any existing claim, has its independence, should be applied as an independent claim, and then placed on an equal footing with damages, without being limited by concepts such as the "filling principle", nor by other principles. [11] On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the attribution of compensation for the benefit of infringement to any existing claim, or as an independent claim, is contrary to the basic concept of the "principle of comprehensive compensation" and should therefore be incorporated into the statutory path of compensation. [12]
2. Discussion on the Application of Infringement Profit Compensation to NPE Litigation
Although in judicial practice, it is difficult to determine the amount of damages as an intangible asset, and it is difficult to give an accurate method of calculating damages, few cases have made in-depth comments on the calculation of damages for special rights holders such as NPE. However, in academia, some scholars have noticed the particularity of NPE as a patentee, and discussed the issue of damages in NPE patent infringement litigation.
(I) Questioning the Legitimacy of Infringement Compensation for NPE Patent Litigation
First, when the NPE is the patentee, because the NPE itself is not the implementer of the patent, the NPE will not suffer a direct loss of profits due to infringement. In this case, if the infringement benefit compensation is applied in NPE litigation, it may violate the basic idea of "comprehensive compensation principle. Under the guidance of this concept, the profits obtained by the infringer should not all be attributed to the obligee, and the input part from the infringer should still be retained by the infringer. Only the part that infringes the market of the obligee should be compensated to the obligee, while NPE itself has not developed and implemented the market. [13] If tort profit compensation is applied to NPE subjects, it may run counter to the long-standing "margin doctrine" of traditional damages law, subverting the basic theory of traditional damages law that focuses on the right holder and takes the actual scope of infringement as the radius of compensation. "The part that cannot be obtained by the right holder even if the infringement has not occurred" is not a "lost benefit", because it lacks the essential characteristic of "lost benefit", that is, "certainty of availability in the future", and that part is also regarded as a "loss" and compensation is instead an unjust enrichment of the right holder. [14]
Secondly, at the result level, the application of infringement profit compensation in NPE patent infringement cases may result in improper incentives for "patent hooligans", which is not conducive to the value of patents and the realization of the legislative purpose of patent law to encourage innovation. Although some scholars support that tort profit compensation should have theoretical independent application space, and should not be restricted by the concept of "full compensation principle", they also think that it is unreasonable to take the constituent elements of damages as the elements of the application of profit deprivation without reflection. Among them, a potential problem of infringement profit compensation is that it may improperly promote the activities of NPE, making the system a tool for NPE to profit. NPE itself does not invent or enforce patents, and does not work on the value of patents. With the form of responsibility for profit deprivation, malicious patent hooligans can turn the labor of the patent enforcement into their own, which is contrary to the basic theory of patent law. [15] In addition, the reasonable license fee in the infringement profit should be regarded as the loss that the right holder deserves but has not received. However, it is far-fetched to completely assume the profit obtained through the infringer's operation as the loss of the right holder. Especially in the case that the right holder has not implemented its intellectual property rights, it is very easy to cause improper incentives to malicious litigants such as "patent cockroaches. [16]
(II) the justification of the application of infringement profit compensation to NPE patent litigation.
First of all, if it is believed that tort profit compensation need not be restricted by the "full compensation principle", the particularity of the NPE subject can be excluded to a certain extent. From the perspective of the value of law, the principle of "prohibition of illegal profit" has been established since the Roman law period. No matter what theoretical path is given to the compensation for infringement profit, illegal management or independent claim, it can eliminate the obstacles caused by the direct loss of interest for NPE to a certain extent, and provide theoretical legitimacy for NPE to apply the rules of compensation for infringement profit in patent litigation. For example, some scholars claim that profit deprivation has independence on the basis of claim. In the field of intellectual property rights, when one party violates the duty of care and damages the legal interests enjoyed by the other party, even if the specific profits obtained as a result of the injurious act cannot be regarded as the attributable interests of the obligee, the obligee still has the right to request the deprivation of the infringer's illegal profits. [17]
Secondly, from the functional level, tort profit compensation has its value to curb infringement. For the necessity of the profit return system, when the perpetrator estimates that the profit is greater than the victim's loss, the infringement will be a more "reasonable" choice, which means that the perpetrator can force the victim to buy out the legitimate rights and interests of the victim. Compared with the traditional damage compensation law's attention to the actual damage in the past, the profit return system focuses on how to effectively prevent the infringement of potential rights, which reflects the re-examination and balance of the legislative purpose of tort law. Based on the above considerations, the request for profit return should not be based on the actual loss of the victim. Tort profit compensation has a strong preventive function, in the actual effect to curb the legal and economic analysis of the sense of the benefits greater than the cost of active tort incentive mechanism. [18]
Finally, tort profit compensation is conducive to simplifying the complexity of the calculation of damages. Some scholars believe that the return of profit is to relieve the victim and solve the calculation problem of damages, judicial practice has to introduce the objective calculation of damages, whether the right holder has the willingness to commercialize their rights and interests, should not ask. [19] It has also been argued that when a profit from infringement is included in the category of loss and is considered a method of calculating loss, it should be used as a measure of abstract loss rather than an accurate calculation of specific loss. The reason why such an abstract evaluation method is established is that intellectual property rights are intangible exclusive rights. As long as others enter the scope of such exclusive rights without permission, abstract losses have already occurred, and such losses It is not equivalent to a specific loss based on the lost benefits, nor will it be excluded because the obligee has not suffered actual losses. [20]
Summarized. As to whether NPE patent litigation can be applied to infringement profit compensation, the domestic academic circles have not formed a unified view, and the views of both positive and negative parties have certain rationality. Considering that NPE originated in the United States and has been operating and developing for a long time in various developed countries, these countries also have relatively rich experience in dealing with NPE. In the domestic academic circles, there is a dispute about the legitimacy of the application of infringement profit compensation in NPE patent litigation, the design of the legal system of patent damage compensation and judicial practice experience are worth our analysis and discussion.
The experience and reference of tort profit in damages under 3. foreign law.
The abolition of the patent infringement profit compensation system in the United States Patent Law in (I).
Similar to the unjust enrichment system of civil law, the unjust enrichment obtained by the defendant is naturally returned to the plaintiff, which is the basic idea of equity. However, the United States abolished the calculation method of illegal profit from patent infringement in the Patent Act of 1946, and the reason for this is that the United States House of Representatives Patent Committee, in explaining the reasons for the elimination of illegal profit, proposed that there would be two major problems in the calculation method of illegal profit: first, it is often difficult to determine accurately what proportion of the profit obtained by the infringer is caused by the infringement; second, the granting of compensation for illegal profits to infringers often results in incidental expenses and delays in litigation. [21] Due to the abolition of the patent infringement profit compensation system in the United States, there is currently no suitable judicial practice experience for reference. However, some scholars have also paid attention to the particularity of NPE as a patentee, and pointed out that because NPE does not compete with the defendant in the market, it will not lose profits due to infringement and can only obtain compensation for royalties. [22]
(II) Compensation System of Patent Infringement Profits under German Patent Law
In German judicial practice, some judgments hold that the legal basis for illegal relief of intellectual property rights is the non-real no-cause management stipulated in Article 687, paragraph 2 of the German Civil Code, that is, "the obligor of compensation knows that he has no right and violates his own will. To manage the affairs of others for his own benefit, the obligee of the right of the property right can still claim to enjoy the benefits obtained from the management of the obligor of the compensation". [23] Based on this theory, the infringer's "enforcement of the patentee's patent" for its "own" benefit constitutes a proposed no-cause management, and the patentee can obtain the value added contributed by the infringer's legitimate actions. There are also views that the theoretical basis of this method is that if the infringer uses the patent to obtain benefits, then the patentee loses the corresponding benefits. This assumption is a legal fiction created by the German patent law, which has nothing to do with whether the patentee actually produces the patented product or whether the patentee brings the patent to the market through license. [24]
For the legislative purpose of the calculation method of infringement profit under German law, it is generally believed that the "simplification" is mainly reflected in two aspects: first, the causal relationship between the infringement and the scope of damage is no longer the focus of investigation, there is no need to examine whether the economic interests of the patentee are affected by the infringement. Second, the infringement profit method bases the compensation calculation on the information provided by the infringer, and the patentee is not required to provide evidence about its own sales volume, etc., so as to avoid exposing its own business information to the infringer who may have a competitive relationship. In judicial practice, the Imperial Court pointed out that when applying the infringement profit method to calculate the amount of damages, it is not necessary to consider whether the patentee itself has the ability to obtain the benefits obtained by the infringer. In other words, even if the right holder's ability to use the patent for production and sales is lower than that of the infringer, the amount of compensation is still determined according to the benefits received by the infringer. [25]
In summary, the German patent law does not set up special provisions on damages for differential treatment of NPE, but in its existing patent law theoretical framework and judicial practice mode, it is sufficient to leave sufficient space for NPE patent litigation to apply infringement profit compensation.
(III) Compensation System of Patent Infringement Profits under Japanese Patent Law
Article 102, paragraph 2, of the Patent Law of Japan provides for the calculation of profit return damages, which presumes that the profits earned by the patent infringer are the losses of the patentee. Similar to German law, Japan also regards illegal management as the theoretical basis of tort profit damages. [26] On this basis, however, if the infringer can prove that the actual loss suffered by the right holder is less than the infringer's profit, the infringer's profit is reduced. This leads to the following: since the return of profits is a presumption of loss of benefits, there is no loss of benefits when the patentee itself does not implement the patented technology, but exists as a licensed subject, so this presumption of loss of benefits cannot be applied. [27]
Summarized. At present, different countries have different provisions on whether NPE patent litigation can be applied to infringement profit compensation. In addition to the United States has explicitly abolished the infringement profit compensation system, German judicial practice provides a legitimate explanation for the application of infringement profit compensation in NPE patent litigation, while the Japanese patent law explicitly excludes the applicability of NPE subjects to infringement profit compensation.
4. epilogue
To sum up, there is still controversy on the legal basis of tort profit damages in academic circles, and judicial practice has not given clear guidance on the particularity of the NPE subject, and there are still doubts about the legitimacy of the application of tort profit damages in NPE patent litigation. The author believes that with the continuous improvement of China's intellectual property protection system and the improvement of the application of infringement profit compensation in the new Patent Law, NPE initiates patent litigation in China and further increases the possibility of claiming the application of the calculation method of infringement profit compensation. Therefore, it is necessary to further clarify the applicable conditions of the tort profit damages system and the particularity of NPE subject in damages.
Comments
[1] See (2019) Supreme Law Zhimin Zhong No. 725 Civil Judgment and (2019) Supreme Law Zhimin Zhong No. 147 Civil Judgment.
[2] See (2019) Hu 73 Zhimin Chu 39 Civil Judgment, (2019) Yue 03 Min Chu 513 Civil Judgment, (2019) Shan 01 Min Chu 871 Civil Judgment.
[3] Article 71, paragraph 1, of the Patent Law of the the People's Republic of China (as amended in 2020): "The amount of compensation for patent infringement shall be determined according to the actual loss suffered by the obligee as a result of the infringement or the benefit obtained by the infringer as a result of the infringement; if the loss of the obligee or the benefit obtained by the infringer is difficult to determine, it shall be reasonably determined with reference to the multiple of the patent license fee. For intentional infringement of patent rights, if the circumstances are serious, the amount of compensation may be determined between one and five times the amount determined in accordance with the above-mentioned methods."
[4] See Chen Yangyue and Ma Zhengping, "The Main Contents and Value Orientation of the Fourth Amendment to the Patent Law", Intellectual Property, No. 12, 2012.
[5] See Wang Ruihe, Interpretation of the People's Republic of China Patent Law, Law Press, 2021, pp. 197-198.
[6] See Shi Jiayou, Zheng Yanji, "The Return of Profits System in Tort Law-Centered on Article 1182 of the Civil Code", in Journal of Gansu University of Political Science and Law, No. 6, 2020.
[7] See Zhu Yan: "The Basis of Claim for" Profit Deprivation "-Also Comment on Article 20 of" the People's Republic of China Tort Liability Law ", in" Law and Business Research "No. 3, 2011.
[8] See note 6 above.
[9] See Li Chengliang, "The Theory of Pluralistic Liability", in Law Review, No. 5, 2020; see Miao Yu, "The Theory of Return of Profits-Centering on Article 20 of the Tort Liability Law", in Law and Business Research, No. 4, 2017.
[10] See Hu Jingjing: "Calculation of Patent Infringement Damages in German Law-Centered on Article 139 of German Patent Law and Article 287 of German Civil Procedure Law."
[11] same as note 7 above; Yang Xiongwen and Ma Zhiwei: "Theoretical Structure of Profit Deprivation in Patent Law", Journal of South China University of Technology (Social Science Edition), No. 6, 2021; Zhuang Yuqing: "Positioning and Application of Return of Infringement Profit Relief in Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights", Electronic Intellectual Property Rights, No. 11, 2021.
[12] See Hu Jingjing, "Basic Research on the Right to Claim Damages for" Profit Deprivation "of Intellectual Property Rights", Legal Science (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law), No. 6, 2014.
[13] See Jiang Ge, "Application of the Rules for Damages in Patent Non-Implementing Subject Litigation", Intellectual Property, No. 11, 2020.
[14] Ibid., supra note 12.
[15] See Yang Xiongwen and Ma Zhiwei, "The Theoretical Structure of Profit Deprivation in Patent Law", Journal of South China University of Technology (Social Science Edition), No. 6, 2021.
[16] op. cit., note 12.
[17] Ibid., supra note 7.
[18] Ibid., supra note 6.
[19] See Miao Yu, "Profit Return Theory-Centered on Article 20 of the Tort Liability Law", in Legal Business Research, No. 4, 2017.
[20] See Zhuang Yuqing, "Positioning and Application of Remedies for the Return of Infringement Profits in Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights", Electronic Intellectual Property, No. 11, 2021.
[21] See He Yudong, U.S. Patent Infringement Relief, Law Press, 2009, pp. 126-142.
[22] Marchese C S, Florey M E, Brooks J R. Retooling Patent Damages Law for NPE Cases[C]//Sedona Conf. J. 2013, 14: 47.
[23] See Zeng Shixiong, Principles of Damages Law, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001 edition, p. 187.
[24] See Dai Zhe and Zhang Yunzhi, "The Calculation Method and Enlightenment of German Patent Infringement Damages", Journal of Chongqing University of Technology (Social Sciences), No. 4, 2017.
[25] Ibid., supra note 10.
[26] See and Yudong, "The Legitimacy and Scope of Application of the System of Compensation for Illegal Profits", Law No. 8, 2018.
[27] See Zhang Peng, "The Concept and System of Calculating the Amount of Damages for Patent Infringement in Japan", Intellectual Property, No. 6, 2017.
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